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Bramblett v. True
No. 02-3, 2003 WL 58283, at *1
(4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2003)
I. Facts
On August 28-29, 1994, Earl Conrad Bramblett ("Bramblett") killed Blaine
and Theresa Hodges and their daughters, Winter and Anah ("Hodgeses").' In
the early morning of August 29, firefighters responded to a call that smoke was
rising from the Hodgeses' home, entered the home, and found the bodies of the
Hodgeses.2 Blaine, Winter, and Anah had been shot in the head at point-blank
range.' Theresa had been strangled, her body covered in gasoline and ignited.4
During the afternoon of August 28, a neighbor saw Bramblett with Theresa
and her children.' At approximately 4:30 a.m. on August 29, a witness traveling
in the area of the Hodgeses' house saw a "pinkish red" pickup truck with a
"dark" tailgate.' At the time of the murders, Bramblett drove a white truck with
a black rear fender.' Later in the mornting of August 29, a neighbor saw
Bramblett drive past the Hodgeses' house while it was still surrounded by
firefighters; he looked over at the house and kept driving.'
Law enforcement officials searched the dumpster outside of Bramblett's
place of employment several days after the murders. They found bills addressed
to Bramblett, a t-shirt identical to one given to Winter not long before her
murder, a document written by Bramblett "detailing his belief that Winter was
sexually attracted to him," and audiotape recordings made by Bramblett that
discussed his obsession with Winter. The officers also found a sketch depicting
the murders accompanied by Bramblett's handwriting.9
1. Bramblett v. True, No. 02-3, 2003 WL 58283, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2003) (opinion not
selected for publication).
2. Id.
3. Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 400,403 (Va. 1999).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 404.
6. Id. at 404-05. Law enforcement officers showed the witness a white truck and a red truck
under lighting similar to the lighting at the time of the murders. She stated that the white truck
looked pink to her. Id. at 405.
7. Id. at 405.
8. Bramblet, 2003 WL 58283, at *2.
9. Id. The drawing consisted of four stick figures. The male stick figure and the children
had Lines drawn to their heads and the female and children had circles drawn around them. Id.
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In addition, a pubic hair that matched Bramblett's DNA was recovered
from the bed where the children were found."0 At Bramblett's place of employ-
ment, a pair of jeans containing traces of fuel oil were found soaking in a bucket
filled with water and silk-screening solvent." Cans of fuel oil found at the
Hodgeses' home matched cans owned by Bramblett's former employer and it
was determined that fuel oil was an accelerant used on the Hodgeses' home.'
Finally, a .22 magnum revolver missing its barrel was found in the bedroom with
Blaine's body. 3 Magnum revolver bullets, shell casings, and unfired cartridges
were found in Bramblett's rented storage warehouse and in his truck. 4 Analysis
showed that these shell casings had markings like those made by the revolver
found at the crime scene.' An expert for the prosecution stated that a shell
casing recovered from Bramblett's truck was fired from the revolver found at the
scene.
16
At Bramblett's competency hearing prior to trial, three psychologists
testified about Bramblett's competency to stand trial.'" One psychologist, Dr.
Nelson, testified that Bramblett suffered from a delusional disorder, a type of
psychosis, that led him not to have a rational understanding of defense counsel's
role in his case.' The remaining psychologists testified that Bramblett had not
incorporated defense counsel into his delusions, and opined that he was compe-
tent to stand trial. 9 The trial court concluded that Bramblett was competent to
stand trial.20
At trial, Tracy Turner ("Turner"), a jailhouse snitch, testified for the prose-
cution." Turner testified regarding conversations he claimed he had with
Bramblett while they were incarcerated together.22 Turner claimed that Bramble-
tt told him that he was " 'addicted to young girls' " and had choked Theresa
when she caught him with Winter.23 Turner also testified that Bramblett told him
that he" 'took care of his business' "with the remaining members of the Hodges




13. Id., at *3.
14. Brambkt, 2003 WL 58283, at *3.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., at *4.
18. Id.
19. Id., at *5.
20. Bramblea, 2003 WL 58283, at *5.
21. Id., at *3.
22. Id.
23. Id., at *3-*4.
24. Id., at *4.
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vit, Turner confessed to fabricating completely Bramblett's confession with the
assistance of a Special Agent of the Virginia State Police.2"
Bramblett was charged with the following offenses: (1) "[c]apital murder
of Winter as part of the same transaction as the murder of Anah;"'26 (2) "the
murders of Anah, Blaine, and Theresa;"'27 and (3) "three counts of using a firearm
in the commission of the murders."2 A jury found Bramblett guilty of all
charges and fixed his punishment at death based on the vileness and future
dangerousness aggravators. 9  The court imposed the recommended death
sentence on Bramblett for the capital murder charge.3"
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Bramblett's claim
that the trial court erred by finding him competent and affirmed Bramblett's
conviction and sentences.3' The Supreme Court of Virginia also denied
Bramblett's subsequent application for state habeas relief.32 Bramblett filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance and that the trial court should have found him incompetent to stand
trial.33 The district court dismissed the petition after finding that Bramblett's
claims did not meet the standards for granting habeas relief found in § 2254."4
The district court more specifically found that "Bramblett had failed to establish
cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the default of his
remaining claims," and denied his request for an evidentiary hearing.35 The
district court apparently denied certificates of appealability for all of Bramblett's
claims. Bramblett appealed the district court's rulings to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and specifically raised six claims: (1) the
district court erred by denying his claim that he was incompetent to stand trial;36
25. Id.,at*11.
26. Brambktt, 513 S.E.2d at 403; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining
capital murder in Virginia).
27. Bramblett, 513 S.E.2d at 403; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (Michie 2000) (defining first-
and second-degree murder).
28. Brambktt, 513 S.E.2d at 403; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Michie 2000) (stating that
it shall be unlawful to use a firearm during the commission of certain felonies).
29. Brambktt, 513 S.E.2d at 403; see VA.CODEANN. §19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000) (setting forth
the procedure for a capital sentencing hearing).
30. Bramblett, 513 S.E.2d at 403.
31. Id. at 406, 410.
32. Brambktt, 2003 WL 58283, at *4. The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Bramblett's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on its merits and found that the remainder of his claims were
procedurally defaulted because of his failure to raise them on direct appeal. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) (setting forth evidentiary requirements for writ of habeas
corpus; part of AEDPA).




(2) his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance;37 (3) the Common-
wealth suppressed evidence material to his defense;3" (4) the Commonwealth
violated his due process rights by knowingly using perjured testimony against
him;39 (5) the Commonwealth violated the Sixth Amendment by eliciting incrimi-
nating statements from him and using these statements at trial;4" and (6) the
district court erred by rejecting his request for an evidentiary hearing.41
II. Holdings
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Bramblett's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.42 The court granted a certificate of
appealability for Bramblett's claim under Napue v. Illinois3 and denied certificates
of appealability for Bramblett's remaining claims." The court held that
Bramblett failed to meet § 2254's evidentiary requirements for his competency
and ineffective assistance of counsel claims.4" The court also held that the
district court correctly found that Bramblett failed to demonstrate the necessary
cause and prejudice to excuse the default of his claims under Brady v. Mayland,4
37. Id., at *6.
38. Id., at *9.
39. Id., at "11.
40. Id., at "12.
41. Brambktt, 2003 WL 58283, at *12.
42. Id., at *1.
43. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
44. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at*1;Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269(1959) (holding that
the prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights by knowingly using perjured testimony
to obtain a conviction); see § 2254 (setting forth the evidentiary requirements that a petitioner must
meet in order for a court to grant a writ of habeas corpus). Section 2253 states that an appeal may
not be taken "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability." 28 U.S.C. 5
2253(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to
Bramblett's Napue claim because at least one judge on the panel found that Bramblett made a
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Brambkta, 2003 WL 58283, at '1. Because the
Fourth Circuit denied certificates of appealability as to five of Bramblett's other claims, the court
should have reviewed these claims using the standard of review set forth in § 2253. Section 2253
states that a certificate of appealability may issue if the applicant has "made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2) (2000). The Fourth Circuit, however,
appears to decide each of these claims on its merits. The proper procedure is set out in Milkr-El
v. Cockrell. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1029 (2003); Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP.
DEF.J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003)).
45. Brambktt, 2003 WL 58283, at *6-*8. The ineffective assistance of counsel issue will not
be further discussed in this case note.
46. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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Napue, and Massiah v. United States.47 Finally, the court concluded that Bramblett
did not meet § 2 2 54's requirements for an evidentiary hearing.48
II. Analysis
A. Bramblett's Competeny to Stand Trial
Bramblett argued that the district court erred when it rejected his claim of
incompetency.49 The Fourth Circuit considered this claim in light of the "well
settled" proposition that the prosecution of an incompetent defendant violates
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ° In order to determine
whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial court inquires into
whether the defendant" 'has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ""5 The court
noted that not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompe-
tence.52
The Fourth Circuit stated that § 2254 contains two provisions applicable to
federal habeas evaluation of state court factual determinations.53 First, §
2254(d)(2) states that a district court may grant habeas relief if the state court's
adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determi-
nation of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing." 54 Second, § 2254(e)(1) allows a grant of habeas if the petitioner can rebut
the presumption of correctness given to state court factual findings by "clear and
convincing evidence."
55
47. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at "9-*12; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(holding that a State violates due process by suppressing material evidence); Napue, 360 U.S. at 269
(stating that a defendant's due process is violated when the prosecution knowingly uses perjured
testimony to obtain a conviction); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (concluding
that a State violates the Sixth Amendment when it elicits from a defendant incriminating statements
after his right to counsel has attached and then introduces those statements against him at trial).
Bramblett's claim under Massiah will not be further discussed in this case note.
48. Brambk, 2003 WL 58283, at *12; see § 2254(e)(2) (stating that a petitioner seeking an
evidentiary hearing after failing to develop the factual issue at trial must establish that his claim
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, facts that could not have been previously discovered, or
facts that would be sufficient to demonstrate that, but for the constitutional error, the petitioner
would not have been found guilty).
49. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at *4.
50. Id. (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992)).
51. Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
52. Id. (quoting Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying Dusky
standard of incompetency to federal habeas proceedings)).
53. Id., at *5.
54. Id.; see § 2254(d)(2) (setting forth a standard for granting a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court).
55. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at *5; see § 2254(e)(1) (stating that the state court's adjudication
of a factual issue "shall be presumed to be correct" unless rebutted by "clear and convincing
2003]
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Bramblett's argument relied on the testimony of the psychologist who
found him incompetent.56 Dr. Nelson determined that Bramblett believed his
defense counsel were part of a plot to kill him, thus preventing Bramblett from
having a rational understanding of their role. 7 The other psychologists did not
agree with Dr. Nelson, and they explained at length the reasons that Bramblett's
delusions did not prevent him from understanding the role of his defense
attorneys.5" The Fourth Circuit found that Bramblett had not established that
the trial court's determination of his competency was "unreasonable in light of
the evidence presented at the competency hearing."59
The court also found that Bramblett failed to rebut the presumption of the
state court's correctness by clear and convincing evidence.6 Bramblett put forth
evidence consisting of a letter from Dr. Nelson and an affidavit from the defense
counsel's investigator.6' The court rejected this evidence and stated that Dr.
Nelson's letter simply repeated what he said at the competency hearing and the
investigator's affidavit only showed that it was difficult to represent Bramblett,
not that he was incompetent by clear and convincing evidence.
6 2
B. Defaulted Claims
Bramblett's petition for habeas relief in the district court included several
issues he had not raised in state court.63 "Absent cause and prejudice, a federal
habeas court may not review constitutional claims when a state court has de-
clined to consider their merits on the basis of an adequate and independent state
procedural rule."64 The court then considered whether Bramblett successfully
evidence").
56. Brambktt, 2003 WL 58283, at *5.
57. Id., at *4.
58. Id., at *5.
59. Id.
60. Id., at *6.
61. Id. The defense investigator's affidavit stated that his preparation of Bramblett's defense
was "significantly impaired" by Bramblett's mental illness. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 28).
62. Brambktt, 2003 WL 58283, at *6.
63. Id., at *9. Bramblett first raised issues under Brady, Napue, and Massiab in his federal
habeas petition. Id., at *9, *11-*12.
64. Id., at *9 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989)). The court further defined the
circumstances under which procedural default will be excused. If the constitutional violation that
petitioner sets forth would result in a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," then default may be
excused. Id., at *9 n.12 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). A miscarriage
is further defined as having possibly resulted in "the conviction of one who is actually innocent."
Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986)). In order to make this showing, the court
stated that the petitioner must show "evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have
confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of




demonstrated cause for his default and actual prejudice caused by any of the
issues he raised.6"
1. Brady v. Maryland Claims
Tracy Turner testified at trial as to statements that Bramblett allegedly made
while they were incarcerated together.66 Bramblett claimed that the notes taken
by a state police officer in his interviews with Turner were "materially exculpa-
tory and should have been disclosed prior to trial."67 These notes did not come
to the attention of Bramblett until the Commonwealth revealed them during
state habeas proceedings.68 In addition, in a post-trial affidavit, Turner stated
that he had an agreement with the Commonwealth to gain benefits in exchange
for testifying against Bramblett.69
The court assumed for the sake of argument that Bramblett could show
cause to excuse his default of this claim."0 However, it found no reasonable
probability that the trial would have concluded differently if Bramblett had these
documents at trial.7 Bramblett claimed that these documents were critical for
impeachment purposes, but the court noted that Bramblett failed to describe
how they were inconsistent with other statements by Turner. 2
In addition, Bramblett claimed that the Commonwealth withheld materially
exculpatory evidence that supported his allegation that the Hodges family was
killed in retaliation for information that Theresa's half-brother, Michael Fulcher,
supplied to the government while he was an informant for the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency.73 The court rejected this argument as mere speculation.74
Bramblett also claimed that the Commonwealth withheld information suggesting
Benjamin Carr's involvement in the Hodgeses' murders.7 5 The court rejected this
65. Id., at *9-*12.
66. Id., at *3.
67. Id., at *9.




72. Id. The dissent thoroughly contrasted Turner's testimony and subsequent affidavit. Id.,
at *14-*16.
73. Id., at * 10. The defense investigator found that Fulcher was placed in protective custody
around the time of the murders. He also found that the police were investigating Fulcher for
money laundering and drug dealing at the same time that they investigated the Hodgeses' murders.
Id.
74. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at *10.
75. Id. Two friends of Cart submitted affidavits that noted that Carr and Blaine Hodges had
a fight while they worked together at the post office. They also claimed that Cart offered to
" 'ice' someone just like the Hodges. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 36, 37).
2003]
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claim and noted that, at best, the evidence supporting it was inferentially
inculpatory of Carr and exculpatory of Bramblett.76
Bramblett also argued that the evidence he presented, even if individually
not enough for reversal, when viewed cumulatively under Kyles v. Wlbitey,77 met
the standard for materiality.7" The court considered Bramblett's Brady evidence
as a whole. 9 After noting that none of the suppressed items related to one
another, the court rejected Bramblett's claim.8" The court stated that none of the
evidence undermined confidence in the jury's verdict.8 '
2. Claim Under Napue v. Illinois
Napue stands for the proposition that a conviction acquired "through the




If there exists any reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony affected the
jury's judgment, then the testimony constitutes a due process violation. 3
Bramblett claimed that an affidavit from Turner supported his claim that the
Commonwealth knowingly put Turner's perjured testimony on at trial.'
The court rejected Bramblett's argument and concluded that Bramblett
suffered no prejudice as a result of Turner's testimony, even assuming that it was
wholly fabricated. 5 The court presented three reasons for finding that Bramblett
was not prejudiced. 6 First, Turner's testimony at trial brought little to light that
was not already in evidence.8 7 Second, Turner's credibility was questionable."
Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor set out all of the circumstantial
evidence against Bramblett and noted that, even without Turner's testimony,
there was enough evidence to convict Bramblett. 9 After discussing this evi-
76. Id.
77. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
78. Brambk, 2003 WL 58283, at *11; see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995)
(stating that the standard for materiality of suppressed evidence includes collective consideration).
79. Bramhkatt, 2003 WL 58283, at *11.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
83. Id., at *11 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7).
84. Id. In his affidavit, Turner alleged that the prosecutors who met with him to prepare his
testimony instructed him to write down the substance of his conversations with Bramblett so that
he could testify that he had taken notes at the time the conversations occurred. Id., at *15 (Michael,
J., dissenting).
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dence, the court concluded that there was not a reasonable likelihood that
Bramblett would have received an acquittal if Turner had not testified at trial."
C Evidentiay Heating
Bramblett also appealed the district court's denial of his request for an
evidentiary hearing.9 The Fourth Circuit assumed that Bramblett met the first
requirement of§ 2254(e)(2).92 However, the court rejected Bramblett's claim and
stated that he failed to satisfy § 2254's requirement that the petitioner demon-
strate that "the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the [petitioner] guilty of the underlying offense."93
IV. Application in Virginia
In determining Bramblett's competency, the general question was answered
through three more specific questions. These questions were as follows: (1)Was
the defendant delusional?; (2) Did the delusion include his defense attorneys?;
and (3) Could the defendant still assist his counsel with his defense? Breaking
the competency issue down to its most basic parts is essential when any compe-
tency issue is raised. This is because, in effect, under § 2254(d)(2), the court can
never find that the state court unreasonably interpreted the facts unless the facts
are made unmistakably clear in the record. If the facts surrounding the defen-
dant's competence are presented loosely, a reviewing court will have a difficult
time determining from the record whether the trial court interpreted them
unreasonably. Therefore, counsel should ensure that the evidence supporting the
defendant's claim of incompetence, and the issues surrounding the specific
version of incompetence alleged, are clear on the record.
Bramblett did not obtain a ballistics expert for his case.94 If counsel seeks
the appointment of an expert, counsel should make the best possible showing of
the defendant's need for such an expert. Husske v. Commonwealth95 held that an
indigent defendant bears the burden of showing that such an expert would
"materially assist him in the preparation of his defense and that the denial of
such services would result in a fundamentally unfair trial."96 Mere suspicion and
hope are not enough to move successfully for the appointment of an expert.97
Bramblett's defense counsel were found to be effective despite failing to seek
90. Id., at *12.
91. Brambkat, 2003 WL 58283, at *12.
92. Id.; see § 2254(e)(2) (stating that a federal court may grant an evidentiary hearing if the
petitioner can show a factual predicate that could not have been discovered previously).
93. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at *12 (quoting § 2254(e)(2)) (alteration in Bramblet).
94. Id., at *7.
95. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
96. Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 1996).
97. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-24 n.1 (1985)).
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appointment of a ballistics expert because only "bare allegations and speculation"
supported such a motion."' Counsel should seek evidence supporting the defen-
dant's need for an expert and present the strongest possible case.
In Brambktt, the Fourth Circuit considered each item of Bramblett's Brady
evidence individually, and then considered its effect cumulatively, as dictated by
Kyles.99 Trial counsel should be aware that the court reviews all Brady evidence
cumulatively in order to determine whether a constitutional violation has oc-
curred. Counsel should, therefore, always make both arguments. Notably, the
court does not treat Brady claims and ineffective assistance of counsel claims in
the same manner. In Fisher v. Angelone,' ° the Fourth Circuit considered the
pieces of evidence supporting the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel individually; the court specifically refused to look at Fisher's evidence
cumulatively.' Thus, despite the similarity between these two constitutional
issues, a habeas court will not use Kyles's cumulative review for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.
Under Brady, counsel has available two types of claims. In a Brady type A
claim, the prosecution has suppressed factually exculpatory evidence. For
example, the Commonwealth withholds evidence supporting the defendant's
alibi. This evidence is never presented. In a Brady type B claim, the prosecution
has suppressed exculpatory impeachment evidence. For example, the Common-
wealth withholds from the defense evidence that could be used to impeach one
of its witnesses. The Commonwealth's witness testifies, but is not impeached.
To succeed on a claim under Napue, the prosecution knowingly must have
presented perjured testimony." 2 The prosecution has thus withheld impeach-
ment evidence, evidence showing that the witness is lying, from the defense.
Thus, a Napue claim is similar to a Brady type B claim.
The court, when considering either a type A or B Brady claim, considers
whether there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'0 3 In
contrast, when the court reviews a Napue claim, the court only considers whether
" 'there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury.""' Despite the similarity between Brady type B claims
and claims under Napue, they are reviewed using different standards. The less
98. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at *7.
99. Id., at *9-* 11.
100. 163 F.3d 835 (4th Cir. 1998).
101. Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims should be reviewed individually, as opposed to collectively).
102. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (stating that the prosecution violates a defendant's due process
rights by knowingly using perjured testimony to obtain a conviction at trial).
103. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
104. Bramblett, 2003 WL 58283, at *11 (quoting Kyes, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7).
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demanding standard of review for Napue claims illustrates the importance of
making a Napue claim separate from any available Brady claims.
V. Conclusion
In summary, Bramblett illustrates four important lessons for defense
counsel. First, counsel must present evidence of incompetence clearly and
thoroughly in order to preserve a record from which a reviewing court can find
that the trial court's determination of competency was unreasonable. Second,
counsel should present its best case in support of the appointment of an expert.
Third, counsel must keep in mind that Brady claims and claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are reviewed differently for purposes of determining
whether constitutional error has occurred. Finally, counsel should recognize that
Napue and Brady claims are distinctly different and require separate analysis.
VI1. Epilogue
On April 9, 2003, Bramblett was executed in the electric chair at the
Greensville Correctional Center."5 Bramblett was the third inmate to choose the
electric chair since January 1, 1995, when Virginia began granting inmates the
choice between the electric chair and lethal injection."6 When Bramblett was
asked if he had a final statement, he stated," 'I didn't murder the Hodges family,
I never murdered anybody. I'm going to go to my death with a clear
conscience.' ,,107
Kristen F. Grunewald
105. Frank Green, Virginia Executes Bramblett, RICH. TIMES DIsPATCH, Apr. 10, 2003, at B1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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